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Juveniles Make Bad Decisions, But Are 
Not Adults & Law Continues to Account For 
This Difference: The Supreme Court’s 
Decision to Apply Miller v. Alabama 
Retroactively Will Have a Significant Impact 
on Many Decades of Reform and Current 
Debate Around Juvenile Sentencing 
 
Danielle Petretta,* Comment 
 
Introduction 
 
In January 2016, the Supreme Court made a monumental 
decision, reflecting the notion that juveniles are not adults.  
For years, courts have been grappling with the notion that 
juveniles are not adults.  The Supreme Court has finally 
published an opinion that will have extreme implications on 
the juvenile justice system. 
Imagine this scenario: A 12-year-old high school student 
grows up in a low-income neighborhood in tough economic 
conditions.  She has a tumultuous relationship with her 
parents.  She has friends at school, and like most young girls, 
she has self-esteem issues.  She finally gets a boyfriend.  Her 
13-year-old boyfriend decides that he wants to do something 
fun.  Because she would do anything to make him happy, she 
decides to go along with him to his neighbor’s house.  Her 
boyfriend wants to steal money from him, and he needs her to 
be a distraction. 
While inside, the girl speaks briefly with the neighbor and 
the boyfriend asks to use the bathroom so that he can look for 
the money.  After the neighbor hears a suspicious noise coming 
from his bedroom, he stops speaking to the girl and finds the 
boyfriend stealing.  The boyfriend panics and grabs a baseball 
bat that he sees in the corner of the room and hits him on the 
head.  The neighbor ultimately dies from the blow. 
Do you know what could have resulted if this happened 
before the case of Miller v. Alabama in 2012?  This 12-year-old 
1
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girl, who could not even get a flu shot without a parent’s 
permission, could have been tried in an adult court and 
sentenced to life without parole.  Furthermore, up until 
January 2016, she would be spending her entire life behind 
bars and would never have the chance of an early release. 
Part I of this Note will discuss the birth of the juvenile 
justice system.  Part II of this Note will briefly introduce the 
recent oral argument heard before the Supreme Court 
regarding whether the Supreme Court will apply Miller v. 
Alabama retroactively or non-retroactively.  Part III will 
discuss the history of the juvenile justice system and show the 
progression of Supreme Court decisions regarding juveniles in 
the penal system.  Part IV will discuss how neuroscience 
throughout the years has incessantly proven that juveniles are 
inherently different than adults.  Part V will discuss and 
analyze the Miller decision and its effects, and Part VI will 
discuss the many implications that the recent Supreme Court 
decision to apply Miller retroactively has on the entire future of 
the juvenile justice system. 
 
I. Background 
 
Until the end of the 18th century, juveniles were sent to 
both jails and penitentiaries.1  However, at the time, a separate 
system for juveniles did not exist, so juveniles were sent to 
serve their sentences in worn-out, overcrowded institutions 
with adult criminals.2  Children were treated as adults and a 
child as young as seven (known then as the age of reason), 
could be sentenced as an adult and even receive a death 
sentence.3 
 
 * Danielle Petretta, J.D. '17, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace 
University.  I wish to thank Professor Leslie Y. Garfield Tenzer, who 
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1. Juvenile Justice History, CTR. ON JUV. & CRIM. JUST., 
http://www.cjcj.org/education1/juvenile-justice-history.html (last visited Mar. 
5, 2017) [hereinafter Juvenile Justice History]. 
2. Id.  
3. SHAY BILCHIK, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 1999 NAT’L REPORT SERIES: JUVENILE 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/9
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Eventually, reformers began to take center stage as 
catalysts for changing the way juveniles were treated.4  In 
1825, the work of reformers Thomas Eddy and John Griscom 
led to the creation of the New York House of Refuge, which 
housed over 1,000 youths.5  These Houses of Refuge were 
essentially the foundation for what later developed into the 
juvenile justice system.6  By the 1840s, around twenty-five 
houses were constructed in urban areas in major cities 
throughout the country.7  The houses were “large fortress-like 
congregate style institution[s],” which on average housed 
around 200 juveniles.8  These establishments were created with 
the hope of rehabilitating, rather than punishing, juveniles in a 
system of adult criminals.9 
As a result of the Juvenile Court Act of 1899, the first 
juvenile court was formed in Cook County, Illinois.10  The 
doctrine of parens patriae, or “state as parent” governed the 
way in which juvenile courts were to conduct proceedings on 
behalf of juveniles.11  The idea was that the state had “the 
inherent power and responsibility to provide protection for 
children [because they lack full legal capacity].”12  The main 
focus turned to the welfare of the child,13 and the proceedings 
were more informal, with each judge having vast discretion 
over each particular case.14 
The 1960s brought more reform to the rapidly-developing 
juvenile system; the courts became more formal, especially in 
situations where the court could either waive the juvenile to 
 
JUSTICE BULLETIN 2 (1999), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/178995.pdf.  
4. See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1.  
5. Id.  
6. Id.  
7. Id.  
8. Id.  
9. ABA DIV. FOR PUB. EDUC., Part 1: The History of Juvenile Justice, in 
DIALOGUE ON YOUTH AND JUSTICE 4, 4-5 (2007), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DY
Jpart1.authcheckdam.pdf. 
10. See BILCHIK, supra note 3, at 2.  
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id.  
14. See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1.  
3
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adult court or give him or her a longer sentence.15  The courts 
also afforded juveniles more due process protections, such as 
the right to counsel.16  In Kent v. United States, the Supreme 
Court held that a juvenile was entitled to a hearing and the 
records of the juvenile court’s waiver decision.17  In re Gault 
further expanded a juvenile delinquent’s rights to include: the 
right to notice of the charges,18 right to counsel,19 the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination,20 and the right to 
cross-examine witnesses.21 
Beginning in the 1980s, the public perception was that the 
juvenile crime rate was increasing and the juvenile system was 
not stringent enough on juveniles, which led to the institution 
of mandatory sentences and automatic transfers to adult 
court.22  In 1986, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, which 
disregarded mitigating factors, became part of the reform 
movement.23 The 1990s were even tougher on juveniles,24 
largely in part because of the superpredator concept that 
developed.25  Princeton Professor John Dilulio coined the term 
“superpredator,” to refer to the increase of juveniles who 
completely disregarded human life and had no remorse in 
committing violent acts, which quickly sparked media craze.26  
This myth continued to spiral as James Wilson and John 
Dilulio predicted that by the end of 2000, one million more 
juveniles, ages fourteen to seventeen, will exist than in 1995.27 
Did these superpredators ever exist?  No.  In fact, the 
notion of a large group of juveniles never came to fruition, and 
 
15. Id.  
16. Id.  
17.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).  
18.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).  
19.  Id. at 40-41.  
20.  Id. at 55.  
21.  Id. at 57.  
22.  See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1.  
23.  Alison Powers, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Mandatory 
Sentencing of Juveniles Tried as Adults Without the Possibility of Youth as a 
Mitigating Factor, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 241, 252-53 (2009). 
24.  See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1. 
25.  JAMES C. HOWELL, PREVENTING AND REDUCING JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY: A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 3, 4 (2d ed. 2009). 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/9
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several researchers have invalidated the myth and found major 
flaws in Wilson’s and Dilulio’s predictions.28  In fact, adults 
were responsible for two-thirds of the increase in murders and 
three-fourths of the increase in violent crimes committed 
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.29  Nonetheless, the 
1990s were “a time of unprecedented change as State 
legislatures crack[ed] down on juvenile crime.”30  Juveniles 
were treated more like criminals with easier transfer 
provisions, more sentencing options, and more open access to 
records and court proceedings.31  Juveniles were confined much 
more, and many institutions became overcrowded.32 
 
II. Current Debate in the Supreme Court: Montgomery v. 
Alabama Revisited 
 
On October 13, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral 
arguments on a 70-year-old case, Montgomery v. Louisiana, in 
which the Supreme Court “ultimately determine[d] whether 
some 2,100 people serving life terms for committing murder 
when they were juveniles have any chance of ever getting out 
of prison.”33  These oral arguments resulted from the Supreme 
Court decision in 2012, Miller v. Alabama, which ruled that 
mandatory life without parole for juveniles under the age of 
eighteen at the time of the offense constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment, because such a scheme does not allow 
consideration of the ability to change or decrease culpability.34  
However, “Miller did not provide nuanced answers to how 
[these factors] matter,” nor did the Supreme Court address 
whether or not the ruling would apply retroactively.35  The two 
 
28.  Id. at 6.  
29.  Id. at 10.  
30.  See BILCHIK, supra note 3, at 5.  
31.  Id.  
32.  See Juvenile Justice History, supra note 1.  
33.  Nina Totenberg, Will Supreme Court Allow Juvenile Life Sentence 
Ruling to Be Retroactive?, NPR (Oct. 13, 2015, 5:14 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2015/10/13/448182651/will-supreme-court-allow-juvenile-
life-sentence-ruling-to-be-retroactive. 
34.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012). 
35.  Marsha L. Levick & Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of 
Miller and Jackson: Obtaining Relief In Court and Before the Parole Board, 
5
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most recent issues before the Supreme Court are whether 
Miller will apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, and 
whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to determine 
whether Louisiana correctly decided to apply Miller 
retroactively.36 
 
III. History of the Juvenile Justice System 
 
A. Monumental Supreme Court Decisions Paving the Road for 
True Juvenile Justice 
 
The Eighth Amendment has been a vital component in the 
Supreme Court’s decisions regarding juvenile detention.  The 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment has woven its 
way into the Court’s rationale in the majority of cases 
regarding juvenile sentencing.  The Eighth Amendment states 
that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”37  In 
Trop v. Dulles, the Supreme Court stated that they “had little 
occasion to give precise content to the Eighth Amendment, and, 
in an enlightened democracy such as ours, this is not 
surprising.”38  Furthermore, the Court stated that the Eighth 
Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”39 
 
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma 
 
In 1988, The Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma 
ruled that imposing the death penalty on a minor, under the 
age of sixteen, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.40  This case dealt with a 15-year-old boy, acting 
 
31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 369-70 (2013).  
36. Montgomery v. Louisiana, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/montgomery-v-louisiana/ (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
37.  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.   
38.  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).  
39.  Id. at 101.  
40.  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).   
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/9
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in concert with others, who participated in his brother-in-law’s 
murder.41  The victim was shot twice, cut in several areas, and 
his body was chained to concrete and left at the bottom of a 
river.42 
The Court held that to determine whether a minor should 
receive the death penalty, a court must look to the “legislative 
enactments” and “jury determinations” to consider why “these 
indicators of contemporary standards of decency” may lead to a 
conclusion that “such a young person is not capable of acting 
with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate 
penalty.”43 
As support for the general proposition that there are 
inherent differences when dealing with the rights of children, 
the Court looked to Oklahoma statutes.44  The Court looked at 
the fact that “a minor is not eligible to vote, to sit on a jury, to 
marry without parental consent, or to purchase alcohol or 
cigarettes.”45  Additionally, the Court noted that because 
juveniles are inexperienced, less educated, and less intelligent, 
they are less likely to appreciate the consequences of their 
actions and are more apt to submitting to peer pressure.46  
Ultimately the Court looked at the two main purposes of the 
death penalty – retribution and deterrence – in deciding 
“[g]iven the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the 
teenager’s capacity for growth, and society’s fiduciary 
obligations to its children . . .”47 imposing the death penalty 
would be an “unconstitutional punishment.”48 
 
2.   Stanford v. Kentucky 
 
One year after Thompson was decided, the Supreme Court 
ruled that the death penalty could be constitutionally imposed 
on a juvenile who commits murder at either sixteen or 
 
41.  Id. at 819.  
42.  Id.  
43.  Id. at 822-23.  
44.  Id. at 823-24.  
45.  Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823. 
46.  Id. at 835. 
47.  Id. at 836-37.  
48.  Id. at 838.  
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seventeen years old.49  In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court held 
that the death penalty for a juvenile offender, who is at least 
sixteen years old, does not constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.50  Two consolidated 
cases were joined before the Court: the first case involved a 17-
year-old boy and an accomplice who raped, sodomized, and 
killed a 20-year-old gas station attendant, and the second case 
involved a 16-year-old boy who stabbed a 26-year-old 
convenience store owner.51 
Petitioners’ argument that the death penalty runs contrary 
to the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of 
a maturing society” failed because they did not show the 
standards of decency of “modern American society as a whole”52 
and because they did not fulfill their burden in showing a 
national consensus that disfavors such a penalty.53  While the 
Court in Thompson noted the importance of statutes when 
recognizing the difference in how the law treats juveniles 
differently, the Court in Stanford boldly veered away from that 
argument.  The Court stated that it is “absurd to think that one 
must be mature enough to drive carefully, to drink responsibly, 
or to vote intelligently, in order to be mature enough to 
understand that murdering another human being is profoundly 
wrong, and to conform one’s conduct to that most minimal of all 
civilized standards.”54  The Court, here, also surprisingly 
rejected ideas coming from socio-scientific data regarding 
juvenile culpability: “The battle must be fought, then, on the 
field of the Eighth Amendment; and in that struggle 
socioscientific, ethicoscientific, or even purely scientific 
evidence is not an available weapon.”55 
 
  
 
49.  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).  
50.  Id.   
51.  Id. at 365-66.  
52.  Id. at 369 (citation omitted).  
53.  Id. at 373.  
54.  Id. at 374. 
55.  Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 378. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/9
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3.   Roper v. Simmons 
 
A few years following Stanford, the Supreme Court began 
to make major changes in the way juveniles were sentenced 
and viewed in the system.  Roper v. Simmons established that 
imposing the death penalty for juveniles under the age of 
eighteen is unconstitutional.56  The Court relied on the 
reasoning in Atkins v. Virginia, which ruled the death penalty 
for the mentally disabled to be violative of the Eighth 
Amendment.57  The Supreme Court in Roper used the Atkins’ 
Court factors, “objective indicia of [national] consensus” and 
the “Court’s own determination in the exercise of its 
independent judgment,” to reach the conclusion that the death 
penalty is too inappropriate of a punishment for juveniles.58 
The Court concluded that juveniles are less culpable than 
adults due to the “objective indicia of national consensus . . . 
the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of 
States; the infrequency of its use . . . and the consistency in the 
trend toward abolition of the practice . . . .”59  Additionally, the 
Court noted that although the crimes committed by juveniles 
cannot and should be not overlooked, capital punishment is 
only meant for heinous crimes committed with extreme 
culpability.60  The Court’s reasoning was that if juveniles are 
more susceptible to irresponsible behavior, are more vulnerable 
and lack control in their surroundings, and are struggling to 
find their identities, they “cannot with reliability be classified 
among the worst offenders” deserving of capital punishment.61  
The Court also recognized that the most brutal crimes could 
potentially override mitigating factors, such as vulnerability, 
youth, and immaturity.62  However, a state cannot take a 
juvenile’s life, because society has deemed eighteen to be the 
age of maturity, and that is “the age at which the line for death 
 
56.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578-79 (2005).  
57.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).  
58.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 552.  
59.  Id.  
60.  Id. at 553.  
61.  Id.  
62.  Id. at 573.  
9
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eligibility ought to rest.”63 
After Stanford, Roper v. Simmons revitalizes the notion 
that juveniles are different and under the law, must be treated 
differently.  However, Roper is “enlightening because the Court 
recognizes that identity is an appropriately critical factor 
separating adults from juveniles for the purposes of 
punishment. Yet [it] is flawed in terms of the Court’s shallow 
effort to provide support for its reasoning . . . . “64 
 
4.   Graham v. Florida 
 
In 2010, the Supreme Court made yet another 
monumental stride in reforming juvenile justice.  Graham v. 
Florida established that life without parole for juveniles who 
committed non-homicidal offenses violated the Eighth 
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.65  The 
Court held that if a state does impose a life sentence, it does 
not need to guarantee the juvenile’s eventual release, but must 
afford the minor a meaningful opportunity for release before 
the end of his sentence.66  In this case, 16-year-old Terrance 
Graham was charged and convicted of attempted robbery and 
later arrested for violating probation by committing a home 
invasion robbery with others, holding the victim at gunpoint.67  
The trial court gave Graham the maximum sentences for each 
charge; he received life imprisonment for armed burglary and 
fifteen years for attempted armed robbery.68  Additionally, a 
life sentence did not offer a defendant any opportunity for 
release unless “granted executive clemency.”69 
The Court began with a discussion of the Eighth 
Amendment and the Trop test for determining whether the 
punishment is cruel and unusual: look to “the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
 
63.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 554.  
64.  Deborah W. Denno, The Scientific Shortcomings of Roper v. 
Simmons, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 379, 395 (2006).  
65.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).  
66.  Id.   
67.  Id. at 53-54.  
68.  Id. at 57.  
69.  Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/9
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society.”70  The Court noted that while “the concept of 
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment,”71 this 
case involved a challenge to a sentence of a term-of-years which 
“applies to an entire class of offenders” who have committed 
different crimes; therefore, comparing the severity of the 
punishment and the seriousness of the crime would not aid in 
its analysis.72 
Instead, the analysis should begin with the “objective 
indicia of [a] national consensus.”73  Disagreeing with the 
argument that there is no national consensus on this issue, the 
Court stated that legislation is not the sole measure of 
consensus, but that sentencing practices factor into this 
inquiry.74  Although there is no express ban on juvenile life 
without parole, actual sentencing practices demonstrate a 
consensus against its use, and recent studies at the time 
revealed that throughout the nation, only 109 juvenile 
offenders nationwide were serving such a sentence for non-
homicide offenses.75 
Noting that a consensus is insufficient to show that a 
punishment is cruel and unusual, the Court followed the Roper 
reasoning by noting that a juvenile’s culpability, along with the 
severity of the crime, must be considered.76  Additionally, the 
Court added that, given the fundamental difference between 
juveniles and adults,77 and therefore, a lessened or diminished 
culpability, a juvenile’s age and the nature of the crime must be 
considered, because life without parole is “especially harsh for 
juvenile[s],” and deprives them of all liberties with no hope of 
restoration.78 
 
70.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 58 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 
(1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).  
71.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 59. 
72.  Id. at 61.  
73.  Id. at 62.  
74.  Id.  
75.  Id. at 62-63.  
76.  Graham, 560 U.S at 69 (“It follows that, when compared to an adult 
murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice 
diminished moral culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the 
crime each bear on the analysis.”). 
77.  Id. at 68-69. 
78.  Id. at 69-70 (“Under this sentence a juvenile offender will on 
average serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than 
11
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The Supreme Court in Graham not only aided in the 
development of how juveniles were perceived, but it 
significantly advanced the argument.  Building upon the 
rationale in Roper, Stamford, and Thompson, the Court began 
to place juveniles into a distinct category for purposes of non-
homicidal offenses, truly underscoring the purpose of the 
institution of a juvenile justice system.  While temporarily 
separating a juvenile from society may be necessary, this does 
not mean that the juvenile will present a risk to society for 
life.79  Furthermore, life imprisonment without parole is not 
justified by any goals of incarceration – deterrence, retribution, 
incapacitation, or rehabilitation.80 
Though Graham provided that life without parole was 
cruel and unusual for non-homicide offenses, the state was not 
required to release the offenders during their natural lives; 
rather, this decision only prevented the states from making 
such a determination from the outset.81 
 
IV. Neuroscience And Social Science Tells Us That 
Juveniles Are Different & Require Different Treatment 
 
It is vital to remember that “[i]mmature judgment, 
impulsivity, and limited self-control bear directly on 
evaluations of criminal responsibility, and developmental and 
neuroscientific research inform those assessments.”82  The 
Supreme Court in Graham was monumental in cataloging the 
differences between juveniles and adults in the justice system.  
The Graham ruling was majorly influential in supporting and 
expanding upon the notion that juveniles are inherently 
 
an adult offender. A 16–year–old and a 75–year–old each sentenced to life 
without parole receive the same punishment in name only.”). 
79.  Id. at 73 (“A life without parole sentence improperly denies the 
juvenile offender a chance to demonstrate growth and maturity. 
Incapacitation cannot override all other considerations, lest the Eighth 
Amendment’s rule against disproportionate sentences be a nullity.”). 
80.  Id. at 71.  
81.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  
82.  Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, 
and Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth 
Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 277 (2013).  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss2/9
 2017 JUVENILE SENTENCING 777 
different than adults and therefore have a lesser culpability.83 
Though cognitive development studies do not reveal much 
support for the assertion that a juvenile at the age of sixteen 
“should be viewed as much different than adults,” the juvenile 
justice system was not based solely upon the notion of 
juveniles’ cognitive capacities, but also upon the notion that 
their judgment was less mature.84 
The human brain matures in an individual’s early 
twenties.85  This developmental feature manifests itself 
through the differences that social scientists observe between 
juveniles and adults.86  With regard to juveniles’ judgment, 
their ability to perceive risk decreases in mid-adolescent years 
and begins to increase in adulthood.87  Additionally, feelings of 
“[e]xcitement and stress cause youths to make riskier decisions 
than adults do.”88  It is no surprise that youths have a lower 
perception of risk and behavior than do adults of a fully 
developed brain; this difference is precisely because the brain 
“governs countless actions, involuntary and voluntary, 
physical, mental and emotional.”89 
Scientists now utilize Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), 
as opposed to x-rays using radiation, to analyze three-
dimensional images of the child’s brain and track its 
developments over a span of years.90  The findings are telling.  
Studies reveal that a teenager’s brain intensely overproduces 
gray matter, which is responsible for thinking, and then 
discards it rapidly—a period known as pruning.91  After 
pruning, development of white matter in the brain—known as 
 
83.  Graham, 560 U.S. at 69-70.  
84.  Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on 
Adolescents’ Competence and Culpability, 18 QLR 403, 410-11 (1999).  
85.  Feld, supra note 82, at 286.  
86.  Id.   
87.  Id. at 285.  
88.  Id. at 281.  
89.  ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE 
JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY 
ADOLESCENCE, BRAIN DEVELOPMENT AND LEGAL CULPABILITY 1 (2004), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_sec
tion_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_Adolescence.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 
ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR.].  
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. at 1-2. 
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myelination—begins, and that white matter creates more 
precise and efficient operation of the brain.92 
These changes occur through an individual’s early 
twenties, and frontal lobe changes occur the most during 
adolescence; the frontal lobe is the last part to develop, “which 
means that even as they become fully capable in other areas, 
adolescents cannot reason as well as adults . . . .”93  While the 
prefrontal lobe lags behind, activity in the limbic system, 
responsible for control over reflexive or instinctual behavior, 
increases.94  Furthermore, science shows that adolescents rely 
more on the limbic system than the prefrontal cortex.95 
Researcher Jay Giedd states the portion of an adolescent’s 
brain that is responsible for organizing, planning, and 
strategizing is not fully developed, so it is unfair to expect a 
partially-developed brain to act like a fully-developed adult 
brain with adult levels of decision-making or organizational 
skill.96  It is worth mentioning that there are also major 
hormonal and emotional changes that occur in an adolescent’s 
brain; for example, adolescent boys experience ten times the 
amount of testosterone, which is associated with higher levels 
of aggression.97  Thus, since “adolescents are less psychosocially 
mature than adults, they are likely to be deficient in their 
decision-making capacity, even if their cognitive processes are 
mature.”98 
In criminal law, there is an underlying assumption “that 
offenders must be able to make rational autonomous choices in 
order to be held criminally responsible,” and if sciences show 
that relevant developmental factors are impeding on a 
juvenile’s exercise of free will, then they should be less 
blameworthy for their crimes.99  All of the data gathered and 
 
92.  Id. at 2. 
93.  Id.  
94.  Feld, supra note 82, at 288-289. 
95.  Id. at 289. 
96.  See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., supra note 89, at 2.   
97.  Id.  
98.  Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of 
Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the 
Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1012 (2003) (citations 
omitted). 
99.  MICHAEL A. CORRIERO, JUDGING CHILDREN AS CHILDREN: A PROPOSAL 
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studied from social and neuroscience over the last few decades 
lends credence to the notion that juveniles are different, and 
the Court has gradually begun to integrate these findings into 
solid precedents for juveniles moving forward. 
 
V. One Step Closer to Victory: Miller v. Alabama 
 
In 2012, the Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama had 
occasion to further expand upon Graham ruling.  The Supreme 
Court held that life sentences without the possibility of parole 
for children under the age of eighteen who have committed a 
homicide, irrespective of any mitigating circumstances, is cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.100  In this case, two 14-year-olds were convicted of 
murder and sentenced to life without parole, without an 
alternative sentence, because state law ordered such a sentence 
without consideration of the youth, attendant circumstances, or 
the nature of the crime.101 
The Supreme Court relied on both Roper and Graham to 
lend support to the conclusion that mandatory life without 
parole violates the Eighth Amendment.102  Not only did the 
cases rely on science and social science, but they also 
established that a juvenile’s “transient rashness, proclivity for 
risk, and inability to assess consequences” lessened culpability 
and supported the notion that with continued neurological 
development, those tendencies will change.103  Consequently, 
such a severe penalty on a juvenile offender cannot be imposed 
as though the juvenile was an adult, as it is in complete 
contravention of the Eighth Amendment principles, 
eliminating any proportionality with the punishment.104 
The Court emphasizes the problem with such mandatory 
life without parole sentences, and that is the uniform 
 
FOR A JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 43 (Temple Univ. Press 2006).  
100.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).  
101.  Id. at 2460 (noting that such a scheme “runs afoul of our cases’ 
requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most 
serious penalties.”). 
102.  Id. at 2464-65. 
103.  Id. at 2465. 
104.  Id. at 2466. 
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treatment of every juvenile:105 
[E]very juvenile will receive the same sentence 
as every other—the 17–year–old and the 14–
year–old, the shooter and the accomplice, the 
child from a stable household and the child from 
a chaotic and abusive one. And still worse, each 
juvenile (including these two 14–year–olds) will 
receive the same sentence as the vast majority of 
adults committing similar homicide offenses—
but really, as Graham noted, a greater sentence 
than those adults will serve.106 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court noted that the mandatory 
sentencing structure eliminates consideration of attendant 
circumstances, such as age, and its accompanying features—
family environment and circumstances of the homicidal 
offense—which may have accounted for a much lesser 
sentence.107  Furthermore, the Court stressed that in imposing 
a sentence, the state must take into account how children are 
categorically different from adults and how those differences 
urge against imposing upon them mandatory life sentences 
behind bars.108 
Justice Kagan, writing for the majority in Miller v. 
Alabama, stated that the Supreme Court has held, on many 
prior occasions, “that a sentencing rule permissible for adults 
may not be so for children. Capital punishment, our decisions 
hold, generally comports with the Eighth Amendment—except 
it cannot be imposed on children.”109  Justice Kagan 
additionally emphasized that life without parole is 
constitutional for non-homicidal offenses for adults, but not for 
children, so if “‘death is different,’ children are different too.”110 
 
  
 
105.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. 
106.  Id. at 2467-68. 
107.  Id. at 2468.   
108.  Id. at 2469.  
109.  Id. at 2470.  
110.  Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 
957, 994 (1991)).   
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A. What happens after Miller? Questions of Retroactivity 
 
Miller v. Alabama seemed to make major headway in 
juveniles’ plight to be treated differently from adults in the 
justice system, but it also left a major area open for debate and 
another hurdle to be conquered for those juveniles languishing 
behind bars.  The major decision was: Should it be applied 
retroactively?  Given the fact that many were going to be 
“potentially affected by the Miller holding, lawyers began 
speculating as to its retroactivity even before the ‘ink was dry’ 
on the decision.”111 
For most of the twentieth century, the Court did not 
distinguish between cases on direct and collateral review with 
regard to retroactivity concerning new constitutional rules.112  
Cases on direct review refer to cases on direct appeal, whereas 
cases on collateral review refer to cases of post-conviction 
challenges after exhaustion of all direct appeals.113  However, 
the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane decided that new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure apply to cases on 
direct review but not “to those cases which have become final 
before the new rules are announced,” or to cases on collateral 
review.114 
The Teague doctrine will only apply to cases on collateral 
review unless the rule falls under one of two exceptions: 1) to 
new substantive rules that “place[] ‘certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal 
law-making authority to proscribe,’” and 2) to “‘watershed’ 
procedural rules that implicate the fundamental fairness and 
the accuracy of the conviction.”115  The Miller decision left the 
state and federal courts to grapple with the meaning and 
exceptions of the retroactivity doctrine provided for by Teague 
and to determine how Miller would apply to juveniles whose 
cases are now final. 
 
111.  Levick & Shwartz, supra note 35, at 375.  
112.  Brianna H. Boone, Note, Treating Adults Like Children: Re-
Sentencing Adult Juvenile Lifers After Miller v. Alabama, 99 MINN. L. REV. 
1159, 1166 (2015).  
113.  Id.  
114.  Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989). 
115.  Boone, supra note 112, at 1166-67 (citation omitted). 
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VI. The 2016 Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana: Miller applies retroactively 
 
On January 25, 2016, the Supreme Court handed down a 
six-to-three ruling, holding that the Court not only had 
jurisdiction to review a state supreme court’s refusal to apply 
Miller v. Alabama retroactively, but also made the 
monumental and long-awaited decision on an uncertain ruling 
– Miller applies retroactively in cases on state collateral 
review.116  In Montgomery v. Louisiana, 17-year-old Petitioner 
killed a sheriff in 1963, and he received a mandatory life 
sentence without parole.117  The trial court denied his collateral 
appeal after Miller because the court determined that Miller 
did not apply retroactively in cases on state collateral review.118 
Collateral review is a post-conviction appeal that is left up 
to the discretion of the court.119  The Supreme Court, a few 
short months ago, finally addressed the question of whether 
states “required as a constitutional matter to give retroactive 
effect to new substantive or watershed procedural rules.”120  
The Court noted that if the outcome of the case depends on the 
new substantive rule, then in cases on state collateral review, 
the court must apply the rule retroactively.121  The Court 
further stated that a court cannot have the power to allow a 
conviction or sentence, in violation of a new substantive rule, to 
stand whether or not there is a final conviction or sentence 
before the rule is announced.122 
Thus, the Court held that, because Miller ruled that life 
without parole for juvenile offenders (except for extreme cases) 
 
116.  SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 36. 
117.  Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 725-26 (2016).  
118.  Id. at 727. 
119.  What Are the Different Kinds of Appeals? What Is an Appeal of 
Right, or a Discretionary Appeal? What Is the Difference Between “Direct” and 
“Collateral” Appeals?, ROTTENSTEIN L. GRP. LLP, 
http://www.rotlaw.com/legal-library/what-are-the-different-kinds-of-appeals-
what-is-an-appeal-of-right-or-a-discretionary-appeal-whats-the-difference-
between-direct-and-collateral-appeals (last visited Mar. 10, 2017).  
120.  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 729.  
121.  Id. at 729. 
122.  Id.  
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is excessive, this qualifies as a new substantive rule because a 
majority of juvenile offenders would remain carrying out a 
punishment that is no longer allowed to be handed down on 
their class.123  The Supreme Court decided that “[t]here is no 
grandfather clause that permits States to enforce punishments 
the Constitution forbids.”124  Further, the Court notes that, 
although Miller held that life without parole could be a 
proportionate sentence in cases where the child’s crimes 
“reflect irreparable corruption,” it “does not mean that all other 
children imprisoned under a disproportionate sentence have 
not suffered the deprivation of a substantive right.”125 
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the very nature of 
children that the string of juvenile cases before this Court had 
concluded; that is, that children are different and they possess 
many different characteristics that essentially make them 
inherently less culpable.126  Also noted was the fact that 
children go through a period of “transient immaturity,” and to 
reflect this reality, many juvenile offenders now imprisoned 
should be eligible for parole so that they are not forced to “serve 
a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.”127 
 
VII. Implications Moving Forward 
 
You may ask, what happens now?  With this long-awaited 
Supreme Court decision now published, over 2,000 eager 
juveniles serving life without parole are squirming in their 
cells at the chance to be eligible for parole.128  This ruling is a 
double-edged sword.  Yes, this is a good thing, because our 
legal system does not allow for juveniles to face 
unconstitutional punishments in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.  However, the problem now is that each state 
 
123.  Id. at 734. 
124.  Id. at 731.  
125.  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.   
126.  Id. at 736.  
127.  Id. 
128. Jesse Wegman, Supreme Court Revisits Life Sentences for 
Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014, 9:24 AM), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/13/supreme-court-revisits-life-
sentences-for-juveniles/.  
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must deal with each case individually and carefully, and this 
will be a difficult process.  States will now have to develop a 
game plan to determine exactly how to deal with these 
juveniles. 
The following is an excerpt from Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
and it shows just how much is now left for state courts to deal 
with: 
Extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders 
does not impose an onerous burden on the States, 
nor does it disturb the finality of state 
convictions. Those prisoners who have shown an 
inability to reform will continue to serve life 
sentences. The opportunity for release will be 
afforded to those who demonstrate the truth of 
Miller’s central intuition—that children who 
commit even heinous crimes are capable of 
change.129 
 
This now gives the States authority to decide whether to 
come up with new sentences or, alternatively, grant parole 
subject to future conditions of the juvenile’s behavior.130  Now, 
juveniles have the opportunity to explain that, at the time they 
were sentenced, they were not unable to be rehabilitated, and 
to prove that they can offer instances of good behavior since 
incarceration.131 
There is another very obvious problem glaring back at the 
states.  The problem is how courts are going to deal with the 
evidence presented by the juveniles as to their ability for 
rehabilitation at the time they were sentenced.  Furthermore, 
how will the courts deal with the evidence of good behavior?  
Surely, not all that is presented by every juvenile can be simply 
put on an equal playing field.  Each case is different from the 
next, so these differences raise difficult questions of application 
that the states must grapple with and deal with fast. 
 
129.  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736.  
130.  Id.  
131.  Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Further Limit on Life Sentences 
for Youthful Criminals, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 25, 2016, 12:26 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/opinion-analysis-further-limit-on-life-
sentences-for-youthful-criminals/.  
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The states will now also have to create some systematic 
approach as to how they will begin to handle a small floodgate 
of juveniles attempting to free themselves of the legal system.  
Finding a system that will determine which cases will be heard 
first and creating lists of major factors needed to be met for the 
eligibility criteria.  On the one hand, there needs to be some 
generally-established set of procedures that the states can 
follow across the spectrum of cases to process each effectively.  
On the other hand, the states must come up with ways that 
will not just lump cases into a general set of factors and 
guidelines.  The states need to account for the fact that every 
case must also be reviewed individually with regard to the 
factors that are pertinent to each particular case. 
 
B. The Decision in Effect: A Chance to Start Over 
 
Just months after this monumental Supreme Court ruling, 
news clips and snippets are beginning to pop up daily.  Decade-
old cases are now being revisited, and those juveniles, now 
adults, may just have a chance at a second life. 
On April 8, 2016, Alex Wong received the news that he 
would be eligible for parole in five years.132  Alex Wong has 
been serving a life sentence since 1989; he was sentenced to life 
in prison at the young age of sixteen after killing two people at 
a restaurant for a Chinese gang, the Green Dragons.133  Mr. 
Wong is now 43-years-old, and he became choked up with 
emotion as he stood before Judge Dearie pleading for a second 
chance: “What I tried to find on the street I had all along in my 
family. I would like for the second half of my life to help the 
people that helped me.”134 
On Saturday, April 30, 2016, after serving forty-one years 
on a life sentence (eight of those years spent in solitary 
confinement), Gary Tyler was released from a notorious 
 
132. John Marzulli, Gang Member Sentenced to Life in Prison as a Teen 
Will Get Second Chance at Life Outside Prison, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 8, 
2016, 5:48 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/teen-gang-
member-sentenced-life-chance-article-1.2593811. 
133. Id.  
134. Id.  
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Louisiana prison.135  He, too, was 16-years-old when he was 
sentenced to death in 1974 for the killing of a 13-year-old white 
student; Gary Tyler was passing through a group of rowdy 
white students on a bus filled with black students, and the 
police later captured a gun.136  Even though the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals recognized that his trial was unfair, Gary 
Tyler still did not receive a new trial.137  Instead, Tyler’s death 
sentence was later commuted to a life sentence after 
Louisiana’s mandatory death penalty was determined 
unconstitutional.138  Gary Tyler has since been completely freed 
from this now unconstitutional sentence, and the shackles on 
his life are finally let loose. 
In this recent trend of avoiding such harsh sentences for 
juvenile offenders, states will need to, and are, making difficult 
decisions regarding the evaluation of a juvenile offender 
coming before a parole board for a chance at early release.  
Iowa is one such state making headway on such an uncertain 
area; on May 27, 2016, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled in a split 
decision that “sentencing juveniles to life in prison without 
parole is unconstitutional because it amounts to cruel and 
unusual punishment.”139  This ruling followed the decision in 
2012 involving Isaiah Sweet, who was the first juvenile to be 
sentenced to life without parole in Iowa after Miller v. 
Alabama; he was 17-years-old at the time he murdered his 
grandparents with an assault rifle.140  Individual circumstances 
were considered at the time of his sentencing, and a 
psychologist testified that Mr. Sweet’s likelihood of 
rehabilitation would be clearer at the age of thirty.141 
The Iowa Supreme Court noted that, since determining 
 
135. Ram Eachambadi, Lousiana [sic] Prisoner Freed After Serving 41 
Years Unconstitutional Sentence, JURIST (Apr. 30, 2016, 5:54 PM), 
http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2016/04/lousiana-prisoner-freed-after-
serving-41-year-unconstitutional-sentence.php. 
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139. Dave Philipps, Iowa Court Rejects Life Without Parole for Juveniles, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/28/us/life-
sentences-juveniles-iowa-isaiah-sweet.html?_r=0.  
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whether the juvenile is “irretrievably corrupt” is near 
impossible when, in the given case, not even trained 
professionals attempt to make this determination, “future 
parole boards would be better suited to make the 
determination.”142  While the Iowa Court has ruled that future 
parole boards are better suited to make the determination of 
whether a juvenile is “irretrievably corrupt,” how exactly will 
that determination be made?  How is a juvenile to be 
determined as “irretrievably corrupt?” 
While some adults are now preparing to enter the world 
after decades growing up behind prison bars, some are still 
fighting for a chance at life.  On Friday, September 23, 2016, a 
judge in Kent County, Michigan, resentenced David Samel, 52-
years-old and behind bars for thirty-five years, to 34½ to 60 
years in prison, which made him immediately eligible for 
parole.143  All that is left for David Samel is to wait for a state 
parole board’s determination as to whether or not he will be 
released from the place that he has been confined to since he 
was just 17-years-old.144  While things are looking brighter for 
David Samel, if the state board parole denies his release, in 
theory, he could be forced to serve the remainder of the new 
sentence: sixty years.  If this is his fate, Samel will be 77-years-
old at the time of his release. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
There is a lot of uncertainty, but one thing is not 
uncertain: juvenile life without parole is no longer 
constitutional; over 2,000 juvenile offenders are languishing in 
jail serving a punishment that is no longer constitutionally 
valid.145  States must now act swiftly.  States must first devise 
a method by which they will begin hearing these cases.  Will 
they be heard at random?  Will they be heard on a “first come, 
first serve” basis?  Will it be those juveniles who have served 
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143. John Tunison, Imprisoned for 34 Years, Juvenile Lifer Gets Shot at 
Parole, MLIVE (Sept. 24, 2016, 10:24 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-
rapids/index.ssf/2016/09/imprisoned_for_34_years_juveni.html.  
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the longest on their sentence?  There must then be a list of 
important and thoroughly analyzed factors for the courts to 
consider and deem necessary in order to consider parole and 
the potential release of these once juvenile offenders. 
Decisions as to each particular case need to be carefully 
examined and made in order to ensure that there is proper 
justice in each case.  However, there is a glaring problem 
staring back at the courts after this Supreme Court decision.  A 
juvenile can still receive long consecutive sentences, potentially 
living up to half of his or her life in prison, which begs the 
question: Isn’t this just as cruel and unusual, and therefore 
unconstitutional, as a life sentence, for the very same reasons? 
Furthermore, are there proper procedures in place to 
handle these former juvenile lifers’ reentry into society?  What 
is needed to acclimate the oldest juvenile lifer in the state of 
Philadelphia, Joseph Ligon?  Ligon is now a 78-year-old man 
who has been incarcerated since 1956.146  What does he need in 
order to get acclimated into a society that is not behind bars, a 
society he no longer has any firm ties to?  Pennsylvania 
Corrections Secretary John Wetzel notes some immense 
difficulties with getting ready for the release of these juvenile 
lifers; according to Samantha Melamed of The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, the change is a “transition from a world where time 
moved slowly to one where the pace is frenzied, and from a 
place with no choices to one where the simplest transaction - 
buying toothpaste, ordering off a menu - involves a dozen 
decisions.”147 
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